The Netherlands Comprehensive Action Programme to Combat Jihadism

The Action Programme is designed and implemented by the Ministry of Security and Justice, the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment in the Netherlands. The overall aim is to prevent, tackle and reduce the threat of jihadist terrorism, especially the problem of foreign fighters travelling abroad for terrorist purposes. There are several elements of the programme:
(i) To reduce the risk of jihadist travellers and foreign fighters through (the removal of passports, stopping the benefit payments of those who have travelled and prosecute those who encourage travelling or recruit foreign fighters; (ii) to intervene and stop travelling through intelligence-led information exchange between authorities; (iii) to prevent the radicalisation of those at-risk individuals through monitoring and removal of jihadist propaganda and the prosecution of distributors of jihadist-related material, alternative and counter-narratives being provided to at-risk individuals, and reducing social tensions as the basis of radicalisation; (iv) to monitor and tackle the use of social media as platforms to radicalise vulnerable individuals, through removing jihadist content and providing reporting platforms; (v) to develop mechanisms that facilitate information exchange and cooperation between various agencies, institutions, authorities, and networks at the local, national and international level; (vi) to build resilience at the societal and community levels by raising awareness of jihadism and the signs of radicalisation, providing family support for relatives of jihadists and foreign fighters, and involving imams and mosques in community engagement; (vii) supporting the disengagement, de-radicalisation, return and reintegration (DDR) of jihadist foreign fighters back into society, utilising a multitude of agencies, such as therapists, social workers, probation officers and law enforcement; (viii) to prosecute those responsible for engaging in terrorist activities while abroad.
The programme adopts a holistic approach to mitigating terrorism, using a multitude of actors and agencies, tackling terrorism at a range of ‘points of intervention’. Its long term, cooperative and sustainable nature makes it a commendable strategy, limited only by its cost and the necessity for a culture of cooperation to already exist between the various governmental and non-governmental institutions and organisations. Transferability therefore rests on the necessity for another national government to have similar resources and capabilities. Its quarterly updates on the progress and impact of the strategy means that it is monitored and improved effectively, and has indeed reduced the overall number of jihadist foreign fighters – although longer-term assessments and more comprehensive and in-depth studies are needed to evaluate the true impact of the programme.

The programme embraces three objectives: to protect democracy and the rule of law, to combat and weaken jihadism in The Netherlands and to remove the breeding ground for radicalisation.

The government actively invests in networks to share knowledge and experience and to generally increase knowledge and expertise among the different agencies/actors involved in the implementation of the strategy. In terms of specific mechanisms, the existence of toolkits for first line practitioners, trainings offered by government and NGO’s, as well as Family Support Centres and an Exit programme for foreign fighters ensures sustainability in the long term.

This national strategy is only transferable if the implementing country takes into consideration that this strategy has been tailored to the needs and nature of the Netherlands specifically. Any country interested in applying this strategy would need to first conduct an in depth-assessment regarding (a) its domestic jihadist threat, (b) its various agencies’, institutions’ and organisations’ capabilities, (c) the potential for cooperation – for example, which cultures and mechanisms may prevent cooperation - between agencies and institutions, and (d) to understand which specific elements of the Dutch strategy is applicable to its needs and capabilities, either at a national or local level.

The Ministry of Security and Justice together with the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment write 4 progress reports every year for evaluation by the Parliament. This is sent simultaneously with the Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands. The reports then feed into the next budget as well as Programme adjustment based on what works and what doesn’t.

a) International cooperation regarding jihadist travellers. The Netherlands plays an active role within the informal EU-group “jihadist travellers”, and also within the Global Counterterrorism Forum where the country plays a leading role together with Morocco in helping to prevent the ‘foreign fighter’ phenomenon. Proactive information sharing has been enhanced with other countries such as Canada, Australia and the US (NCTV et al., 2014: 28).
b) Multi-agency cooperation at the national level. Research is conducted between the Ministry of Defence, the AIVD and the Dutch National Police regarding existing and new means and methods with which attacks are mounted and whether additional counter-measures are required (ibid: 7).
c) Cooperation with front-line practitioners in numerous disciplines and across civil society. A few examples of this cooperation are 1) the network of imams and mosques administrators that work with government to counteract the distribution of jihadist messaging by radical preachers, 2) support for educational institutions that are known to have active
jihadist networks or sympathisers present among their students. Furthermore, educational institutions who have requested assistance in this respect will be granted support from the government. 3) The provision of a support facility for family members, friends or people related in any other way (such as teachers) to departed foreign fighters, radicalised individuals, as well as those deemed ‘at risk’ of either.
d) Other methods of cooperation include information exchange though citizen’s hotline at the national and local level.
? Ministry of Security and Justice (VenJ)
? Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (SZW)
? National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV)
? Netherlands General Intelligence and Security Service. (AIVD)
? Netherlands Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD)
? Ministry of Defence (MinDef)
? National Large-scale Special Operations Unit (NSGBO)
? Municipal and National Government Authorities
? Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND)
? Public Prosecution Service (OM)
? Dutch National Police
? State School for Countering Radicalisation (ROR)
? Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (KMar)

The government of The Netherlands announced on a letter to parliament (27/02/15) its plans to invest €128.8 million over the coming years in order to tackle the jihadist threat.

Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid (NCTV). Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (VenJ). Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (SZW). 2014. The Netherlands Comprehensive Action Programme To Combat Jihadism. Den Haag.
Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (VenJ). 2017. TK Bijlage 1 Voortgangsrapportage Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme. TK Bijlage. Den Haag: Rijksoverheid. https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2017/04/06/tk-bijlage-1-voortgangsrapportage-integrale-aanpak-jihadisme

https://english.nctv.nl/binaries/def-a5-nctvjihadismuk-03-lr_tcm32-83910.pdf
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2017/04/06/tk-bijlage-1-voortgangsrapportage-integrale-aanpak-jihadisme

The comprehensive action programme comprises measures that aim to curb radicalisation and counter and weaken the jihadist movement in the Netherlands. The coherent use of these targeted security and preventive actions ensures that the government has an effective mix of measures at its disposal to confront the current threat. In spite of this, an attack can never be ruled out.
The practices within this framework are consistent with the overall goal of the project. On the one hand, important efforts are made in order to prevent violent extremism and radicalisation that lead to terrorism, and on the other, solid measures are being implemented against those who have been radicalised in order to avoid possible acts of terror. Thus, the necessity to combine short-term and long-term measures is being addressed throughout this strategy.
Moreover, the Programme is relevant in the sense that it combines top-down and bottom-up strategies. It is important to acknowledge the salient role that non-state actors can play in the national counter-terrorist strategy of a country. In this case, religious actors, civil society organisations, community leaders and front-line practitioners are central to the Programme’s implementation and development. This inclusion amounts to a modern strategy, with fluent synergy between all actors of society that combine to better tackle the terrorist threat.

The central aim of the programme is to (re)connect the person in question (radicalised or in-the-process of radicalisation) with society in a positive manner. With regards to areas of intervention, the programme works under the presumption that every case is different, and therefore results in an array of customized solutions, designed to meet the needs of the individual and specific actor involved. The reports indicate that the objectives of having tailored solutions to individual at-risk and incident cases have so far been achieved.
First line practitioners (such as specialized psychiatrists, coaches and youth workers) play an important role and are involved in order to have effective responses in prevention and/or reintegration by successfully combining multiple disciplines to achieve holistic understanding of the problems faced, and to develop multi-faceted solutions. Because the solution takes into account multiple actors it can therefore can be more adequately monitored and improved in multiple dimensions.
The approach also includes specific punitive measures, such as revoking a person’s passport, stopping a person’s benefit payments, freezing assets, compulsory admission to a mental hospital, or the removal of children from parental custody. In this way, the approach doesn’t only have a preventative element, but instead as well effectively integrate a range of targeted solutions and measures that can combat potential terrorist activities and the risks associated with that – such as the radicalization of the individual’s children.

Since the implementation of the programme, at least 386 jihadism-related criminal investigations have been conducted in the Nether-lands and about 471 suspects have been investigated. However, it is unclear how to measure the cost-efficiency of the programme, as no clear indicators have been given regarding successful prosecution subsequent to these arrests.
The Temporary Law on Administrative Measures Against Terrorism has entered into force on March 1, 2017. With this Act, the Minister of Security and Justice has been given powers for imposing freedom-limiting measures on persons who, due to their behaviour, may be associated with terrorist activities or their support. In such cases, the person concerned may impose an area ban, a ban on contact, and / or a reporting obligation. An expulsion ban may be imposed if there is a reasonable suspicion that someone will join a terrorist organisation that poses a threat to national security. The new law also provides the basis for governing bodies for refusing or withdrawing subsidies and permits, among other things, if there is a risk that these will be used for terrorist activities.
In support of the expulsion ban, the Passport Act has been amended. This will void passports and Dutch identity cards as a result of the im-position of an expulsion ban. In addition, it becomes possible to give the person concerned a replacement ID that only travels within Schengen. Since February 2015, the visa application of 13 individuals has been rejected or the visa issued by the Netherlands or another Schengen Member State has been withdrawn because they threaten public order. Also, extremist speakers from third countries who are found to be a threat to public order are signaled for refusal in the Schengen Information System (SIS).
These laws and powers represent an efficient way of tackling a terrorist threat directly, removing various mechanisms of facilitation for terrorism – such as the freedom of movement and the limiting of the freedom of speech. However, any societal harm that may result from the suppression of certain human rights has not been adequately measured, and therefore (i) a more long-term understanding is needed of the efficiency of such an approach, (ii) any efficiency evaluation should take into account the lack of this understanding, and (iii) comparative studies should be done between this approach and the preventative and reintegration elements of the same programme, to see if direct removal of freedoms is more or less efficient than attempting to prevent radicalisation or reintegrating already radicalised individuals.

The reporting platform, ‘Meld Misdaad Anoniem’ (“Report Crime Anonymously”), and more specifically their extremism reporting section of the platform, released data that in 2016 it received 120 unique reports in the field of extremism and radicalisation. This is a 15% decrease over 2015. The impact seems therefore to be relatively positive. More studies and overall monitoring of the approach needs to be undertaken to assess long-term impact and to see if there are any reversals of this impact.

Sustainability is enhanced through trainings that allow to transfer skills and knowledge to diverse actors who are or might be involved with radicalised individuals. A good example of this is the training 'Extreme Careers’. This workshop focuses on radicalisation from an educational perspective. During the period September 2016 to March 2017, approximately 1105 professionals attended the training, including care workers, education professionals, (district) agents and community officials. The training has been extended since 2017 with a module about moral dilemmas encountered by professionals, and with more knowledge of extreme right.
Furthermore, there has been a strong element of strengthening the capacity of local actors: a total of 19 municipalities / regions have been allocated 6.4 million euros for 2017. These funds support plans in the field of:
? Analysis of the local problem and degree of resilience of the municipality / region.
? Enhancing the person-oriented approach.
? Reduce radicalisation by focusing on networking of key figures and strategic networks as well as activities close to the family or the environment of persons who may (potentially) radicalise.
? Promote knowledge and expertise of (semi-) professionals: counteract Radicalisation (ROR) through training at the Rijksopleidingsinstituut.
This budget allocation has allowed for specific authorities to assess the most effective and efficient means to tackle the jihadist threat in their localities. The ROR trainings, the building of networks and alliances, the long-term strategic and local development, as well as the building of a culture that focuses on the individual is a good demonstration of the sustainable nature of the approach. This being said, the cost of the approach may make the venture unsustainable unless these elements become more central to the overall strategy.

The programme is at its core designed and implemented by the Ministry of Security and Justice, the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment in the Netherlands.
However, this programme takes a holistic approach to the involvement of many pertinent societal actors from a multitude of disciplines. This includes government ministries, agencies and institutions, actors and organisations from the non-profit sector, as well as various first line practitioners from a spectrum of professions.