The Danish 'Preventing and Countering Extremism and Radicalisation' model - A practice of creating Comprehensive Strategies to Counter Extremism and Terrorism
- Dänemark
- Start Date: 2009
The Danish government believes that a high level of preparedness against terrorism is necessary to maintain the security, stability and safety in Denmark and thus, the fight against extremism and the prevention of radicalisation are highly prioritised in the Danish effort against terrorism.
But the aim of preventing extremism and radicalisation is not merely to ward off terrorism – it also has wider implications for society. The Danish government wishes to stem the negative influence of extremist groups in local communities and on social media, in order to protect the country’s general welfare and safety. The independence, critical thinking and democratic skills of children and young people must be nourished, as it helps to increase their resilience to radicalisation. It also constitutes an intrinsic goal in a dynamic, democratic society to secure the development and active citizenship of children and young people.
Consequently, the interventions and initiatives described in this action plan must be seen in connection with various other efforts, including the fight against terrorism, but also crime prevention and social efforts such as the Danish integration effort.
The new initiatives in the Danish prevention model action plan (October 2016) aim to create a more coordinated and knowledge based coordination effort, a more enhanced effort in police districts and municipalities, counter extremist propaganda and prevent online radicalisation, create a hard line against foreign fighters, create a targeted intervention in criminal groups, create stricter measures against radicalisation in prisons, provide systematic effort in day-care facilities, primary schools and upper secondary schools, strengthen involvement of local communities, enhance the international effort.
• Info-house. Assessing concerns, and planning and coordinating prevention of radicalization
• Centralization of knowledge and methods made available to professionals and the wider public
• Advise and counselling for professionals
• Providing information about radicalization to the public
• Coaches and mentors for young people and their families
• Support, advice, counselling and mentoring for returnees who wish it
• Outreach to local communities and other actors in contact with such individuals
National hotline offering assistance to “parents, relatives, and others concerned that a child, a young person or an adult is at risk of radicalization or al- ready part of an extremist milieu”
Although the policy and the concrete methods and initiatives associated with it are continuously being developed to meet contemporary challenges, the approach in its entirety rests on a set of fundamental premises ranging from understandings of the welfare state to understandings of crime and of how behaviour can be changed. In order for other countries to determine whether there are lessons to be learned from the Danish approach, knowledge is required about the understandings and structures into which it is incorporated.
It will never be possible to conduct a quantitative evaluation of the preventive efforts by counting the number of individuals who have not become radicalized as a result of them or the number of terrorist plots that have not been started, but it would be possible to conduct a qualitative study of exit programmes and intervention activities. In doing so, it would be extremely important to emphasize the user perspective by interviewing those involved.
Yes.
• Schools, Social Services & Police (SSP),
• The Network of Prison and Probations Services
• Social Services & Police (KSP),
• Network of Psychiatry, Social Services & Police (PSP),
• Centre for Prevention,
• Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing.
• Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET)
• Centre for Terror Analysis (CTA)
• Ministry of Justice
• Danish Police districts
• The Danish Agency for International Recruitment and Integration (SIRI)
• Danish Police’s National Crime Prevention Centre (NFC)
• The National Agency for Education and Quality (STUK)
“PREVENTING AND COUNTERING EXTREMISM AND RADICALISATION
NATIONAL ACTION PLAN.” EC EUROPA, Oct. 2016, ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/
sites/homeaffairs/files/what-wedo/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/
docs/preventing_countering_extremism_radicalisation_en.pdf.
“An Introduction to THE DANISH APPROACH TO COUNTERING AND
PREVENTING EXTREMISM AND RADICALIZATION.”
Danish Institute for International Studies, 2015,
www.ft.dk/samling/20151/almdel/reu/bilag/248/1617692.pdf.
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The Danish approach relies heavily on cooperation and coordination between different sectors, authorities, institutions and individuals. Such cooperation can be challenging, not least when it is not entirely clear who has the final coordinating responsibility, for example, in relation to transition from one system to another, such as prison to municipality. Following the Copenhagen shootings in February 2015, this challenge has been addressed both nationally and locally, and improvements will undoubtedly be seen, but it is unlikely that all the challenges will ever be completely overcome. Cooperation, particularly between different agencies and between agencies and other actors, will always be challenging. This is in no way unique to this area and should not be seen as an argument for abandoning cooperation.
In the early years of the development of the Danish approach, there was another challenge to cooperation, namely that not all parties felt comfortable in becoming involved. The general impression among the central actors seems to be that such resistance has decreased over the years, not least because the Copenhagen shootings in February 2015 and the fact that at least 125 Danes have travelled to Syria and/or Iraq, where at least a fifth have died,50 has led to a consensus that something has to be done. One civil servant, who has been involved in these efforts since the beginning, described the change by painting the picture of civil servants, who in the early years contacted frontline staff to get them on board, being met with rotten tomatoes, whereas today the frontline staff ask for assistance. One of the strengths of the Danish approach is its flexibility, the inclusion of different types of professionals who view challenges and specific cases in different ways and the fact that it leaves room for individual assessments. But the lack of clear definitions and success criteria means that providing room for individual professional assessments carries with it the risk of leaving room for the individual professional’s prejudices or (mis)understandings as well.
The increase in awareness and extended networks among both professionals and members of civil society who have been trained and/or encouraged to spot early signs of concern can be effective elements in any type of prevention, but they also carry with them the risk of being perceived as detailed surveillance networks moni toring everybody’s actions everywhere or, perhaps more damagingly, particular parts of the population alone. “When this awareness network is expanded specially to target those identified as ‘at-risk communities’ – typically communities with a majority of Muslim immigrants – it is obvious that citizens of these communities may feel exposed to increased surveillance and selected targeting just because they are Muslim immigrants. [...] In other words, outreach and awareness programs that are implemented in order to create safety and trust in society, as well as to prevent radicalization and extremism, risk the unintended consequence of creating a society of mistrust, with the additional danger of laying the ground for more radicalization rather than preventing it.
As indicated several times, the lack of clear definitions of radicalization and extremism continues to be a challenge. So too does the lack of any consensus over what the problem is and what the exact aim, or success criteria, of preventive efforts is. These challenges could most likely be minimized through a wholehearted effort to evaluate the effects of existing initiatives because such a process would necessarily establish common definitions and success criteria and simultaneously flush out any symbolic gestures. As in other countries, there have been evaluations of the implementation and the output of efforts in Denmark, but so far none of the actual outcomes and effects. The need for such evaluations of efforts is continuously emphasised by the political criticisms of the approach described earlier. As long as there are no evaluations to inform the debate, it will remain open to assumptions, gut feelings and opinions that are not necessarily conducive to the development of an effective approach.
Nationally two main actors cooperate and to some extent coordinate regional and local efforts, but also engage directly. One is a centre for prevention at the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET), which focuses primarily on security and on preventing illegal activities. The other is a division for prevention at the Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing, which has a broader focus on preventing extremism and radicalization, including a focus on more social aspects.